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CRAIG D. BROADBENT, DAVID S. BROOKSHIRE,
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Water Leasing: Evaluating Temporary
Water Rights Transfers in New
Mexico Through Experimental
Methods**
ABSTRACT
Rapid population growth coupled with stable or decreasing water
supplies has further stressed already over-allocated water resources
in the western United States. In this article, we consider the issues
that lead to the further consideration of a water market. Specifically,
we consider water markets that allow for the temporary transfer
(lease) of a water right as one possible mechanism that could provide
flexibility for water managers to fulfill water demands in fully or
over-allocated watersheds. Using the Middle Rio Grande Basin lo-
cated in central New Mexico as a backdrop, we develop a prototype
coupled model that incorporates natural, physical, and engineering
dynamics with an economic trading model where a variety of water
users in the basin are represented. We explore the robustness of this
prototype water leasing market and its ability to provide flexibility in
water management. The empirical testing of the coupled model satis-
fies three necessary conditions: (1) efficient prices; (2) multiple
transactions between user groups; and (3) minimal impact upon the
natural, physical, and engineering system, as measured by water
movement resulting from trading. Finally, we discuss how this trad-
ing structure might relate to a larger-scale application in the Middle
Rio Grande Basin.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water management increasingly depends upon flexible institu-
tions that allow for the efficient allocation of scarce water resources. In
the semi-arid West, most watersheds are fully or over-allocated as water
demand from population growth continues to increase and the supply of
water is subject to uncertainty and variability. The complexity of this
water allocation challenge is heightened by the increasing importance
over recent decades to formally incorporate Native American rights and
environmental concerns into the water management system.
These anthropogenic changes and possible climatic variations cre-
ate a need to develop alternative institutional responses for water alloca-
tion such as water leasing markets. These market institutions must be
efficient, fair, transparent, voluntary, temporally and spatially flexible,
and must address hydrologic and engineering realities.
Support for water market institutions exists at both the national
and state level. In 2005, the U.S. Department of the Interior released the
publication, Water 2025: Preventing Crises and Conflict in the West.1 This
document “promotes the idea of working together for the sustainable
and efficient use of western agricultural water supplies,”2 and is based
upon six principles that must be recognized to minimize or avoid water
conflicts.3 In addition, many western states (California,4 New Mexico,5
1. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025 PREVENTING CRI-
SES AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST (2005), available at http://biodiversity.ca.gov/Meetings/
archive/water03/water2025.pdf; see also http://www.doi.gov/water2025 (for up-to-date
information on “Water 2025”).
2. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 1, at 31. R
3. See id. at 3. These six principles are: (1) solutions to complex water supply issues
must recognize and respect state and federal water rights, contracts, and interstate com-
pacts or decrees of the U.S. Supreme Court that allocate the right to use water; (2) existing
water supply infrastructure must be maintained and modernized so that it will continue to
provide water and power; (3) enhanced water conservation, use efficiency, and resource
monitoring will allow existing water supplies to be used more effectively; (4) collaborative
approaches and market based transfers will minimize conflicts between demands for water
for people, for cities, for farms, and for the environment; (5) research to improve water
treatment technology, such as desalination, can help increase water supplies in critical ar-
eas; and (6) existing water supply infrastructure can provide additional benefits for existing
and emerging needs for water by eliminating institutional barriers to storage and delivery
of water to other uses while protecting existing uses and stakeholders. Id.
4. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, http://www.waterplan.
water.ca.gov (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
5. N.M. OFF. OF THE ST. ENG’R, NEW MEXICO STATE WATER PLAN, http://www.ose.
state.nm.us/publications_state_water_plans.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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Nevada,6 Utah,7 and Wyoming8) have developed state-level water plans
to address water management issues.
There are currently two broad categories associated with the wide
spectrum of water market institutions: permanent transfers9 of water
rights and temporary transfers (leasing)10 of water rights. While water
markets concerning permanent transfers of water rights have been stud-
ied for the better part of the last four decades,11 the use of a water market
institution for the leasing of water rights has not been studied as in-
tensely. In fact, most leasing studies have only recently appeared over
the last 10 years.12 As such, there is limited understanding of the feasibil-
ity of water leasing markets.
Effective water leasing markets must consider the relevant natu-
ral, physical, engineering, and economic (behavioral) factors in the deci-
sion-making process. As such, the market must deal with the complexity
and interconnections within and between the natural and human envi-
ronments. To allow for the efficient allocation of water resources, cou-
pled modeling, within the context of a decision support system, provides
a mechanism to integrate the natural, physical, and engineering dynam-
ics of a watershed with the behavioral factors of users in that watershed.
Such a framework captures the natural and engineering factors that
demonstrate when a water supply is available and how it flows through
the system. The coupled framework further integrates institutional fac-
tors such as the priority rights structure, population, market rules, and
the market model.
In 2004, the Washington State Department of Ecology in conjunc-
tion with West Water Research released a report entitled, Analysis of
Water Banks in the Western States,13 that provides an analysis of then-cur-
rent water marketing policies, legislation, and programs in 12 western
6. NEV. DIV. OF WATER RES., NEVADA STATE WATER PLAN, http://water.nv.gov/water
planning/wat-plan/con-main.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
7. UTAH DIV. OF WATER RES., UTAH STATE WATER PLAN, http://www.water.utah.
gov/waterplan (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
8. WYO. WATER DEV. OFF., WYOMING STATE WATER PLAN, http://waterplan.state.wy.
us/history.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
9. A permanent transfer of a water right is the permanent transfer of a water right
from one user to another.
10. A temporary transfer, or lease, of a water right allows for a water right holder to
provide for an intermediate use while retaining his ownership of the right for future use.
11. See, e.g., MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE (K. William Easter et
al. eds., 1998).
12. See generally WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ANALYSIS OF WATER BANKS IN THE WESTERN
STATES (2004), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0411011.pdf (reviewing these
markets).
13. Id.
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states. One factor that has limited the effectiveness of the water leasing
markets highlighted in this report is the rigidity of the trading rules. The
markets detailed in the report have fixed prices or market-based pricing
allowed only within a set interval. In addition, many of these water mar-
kets utilize a clearinghouse setting.14 This clearinghouse system does not
address the natural, physical, and engineering constraints of the water-
shed and also may not provide the flexibility of a real-time market. Fur-
ther institutional constraints exist, including one-year limits on leases,
which limit inter-temporal trading that might alleviate water problems
during prolonged drought. In addition, only water that is stored can be
brought to the market, or water can be purchased only for long-term
groundwater storage with large participation or application fees that
often deter potential buyers and sellers from entering the marketplace.
Arguably, such constraints limit the number of transactions and the ef-
fectiveness of the market institution.
To examine the potential of a water leasing market, we develop
and test through experimental economic techniques a coupled hydro-
logic, engineering, institutional, and economic market using the Middle
Rio Grande Basin located in central New Mexico as a backdrop for devel-
oping a prototype water leasing market.15 First, we develop a hydrologic
model that represents the natural, physical, and engineering dynamics of
the basin, and the outputs of this coupled model are integrated with a
trading market. Second, we conduct laboratory market experiments16
that use these hydrologic outputs as initial allocations to each partici-
pant. The coupled model reports the number of transactions during each
trading period and provides detailed information on individual trades,
such as who engaged in the transaction, the amount of water traded, the
price paid per acre-foot, and the impact of water trading upon the physi-
cal system. This framework allows us to observe the number of transac-
tions (a sign of market robustness), the volume of water traded, carriage
gains and losses, the impact of water movement upon the physical sys-
14. In a clearinghouse framework, the bids for buying water are posted on bulletin
boards managed by an irrigation or water management district. Transactions are con-
ducted through negotiations between a single buyer and a single seller.
15. This prototype model is the first stage in a four-stage process to evaluate a water
leasing market. The second stage develops an enhanced farming model; the third stage
evaluates the potential of a futures contract, while the fourth stage examines third-party
effects as a result of market transactions.
16. Experimental economics allows a researcher to test hypotheses by inducing values
to participants. A properly designed economic experiment will be salient—meaning that
participants perceive that they are paid based upon decisions they make—and the experi-
ment will have parallelism—meaning it is constructed to resemble the natural decision-
making process as closely as possible.
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tem, the prices paid by user group, and the overall market price, all
within the context of alternative climatic scenarios.
Part II of this article demonstrates the need for a water leasing
market using the Middle Rio Grande Basin in New Mexico as an exam-
ple. Part III discusses issues in designing water market institutions. Part
IV provides a review of the current theoretical and empirical studies on
existing water leasing markets. Part V details the coupled prototype leas-
ing market and explains how to test whether this market is efficient; and
Part VI reports the natural, physical, and economic findings of market
transactions. Part VII offers conclusions and suggestions for future
research.
II. NEED FOR A WATER LEASING MARKET
Between 1990 and 2000 the U.S. Census Bureau reported popula-
tion growth rates in the 12 western states to be 66 percent in Nevada
relative to 9 percent in Wyoming.17 The 10-year growth rates translate
into a 7 percent annual growth rate in Nevada and a 1 percent annual
growth rate in Wyoming. Recent estimates from 2000 to 2007 report fur-
ther population growth rates from 28 percent in Nevada relative to 6
percent in Wyoming.18 In fact, each of the western states has continued to
experience population growth from 2000 to 2007.
Population growth places additional demands on existing water
supplies. At the same time, these water supplies have not increased and
are subject to climatic variability leading to considerable uncertainty
from year to year. The Western Regional Climate Center has summa-
rized this volatility by measuring and recording the monthly average
precipitation for each state in the United States from 1931 to 2000.19 For
example, precipitation in New Mexico has varied from roughly 12.5 in-
ches per year to 14.4 inches per year, while precipitation in Nevada has
varied from 8.25 inches to 9.5 inches per year over this period. As de-
mand for water resources continues to increase with uncertain water
supplies, allocating scarce water resources becomes increasingly diffi-
17. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Finder [hereinafter U.S. Census Bureau, Popu-
lation Finder], http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?_submenuId=Popu-
lation_0&_sse=ON (select a state to view its population) (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
18. See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Population Estimates [hereinafter U.S. Census Bu-
reau, 2007 Population Estimates], http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPage
Servlet?_program=PEP (scroll down to and select 2007 population estimates) (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010).
19. Western Regional Climate Center, Average Statewide Precipitation for Western
U.S. States, http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/htmlfiles/avgstate.ppt.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2010); see also NAT’L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., HISTORICAL CLIMATOGRAPHY, SERIES NO. 4-2, avail-
able at http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/climatenormals/hcs/HCS_42.pdf.
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cult. Not only has demand for water increased in recent years, but water
resources must also serve traditional users such as Native American
tribes and acequias, in addition to serving irrigated agriculture, munici-
pal, industrial, and environmental interests.
To fully understand the effects of population growth with varia-
bility in water supply throughout the western United States, we turn to a
portion of a single river basin as an example to illustrate these tensions:
the Middle Rio Grande Basin20 located in central New Mexico. This basin
faces significant population growth and issues related to Native Ameri-
can water rights (i.e., adjudication of rights and litigation around Indian
Pueblos’ historic use rights), ecosystem maintenance of Bosque habitat as
a corridor for migratory bird species, and maintenance of instream flows
for endangered species such as the native silvery minnow (Hybognathus
amarus).
Historically, New Mexico has experienced fluctuations in water
supply as indicated by the reconstruction of stream flow data for the Rio
Grande using tree-ring analysis.21 This reconstruction displays both an-
nual and inter-annual variability in stream flow. Further, since 1970, the
U.S. Geologic Survey gage south of Cochiti Reservoir, just north of Albu-
querque, has measured the wettest period on record, one of the driest
years on record, and one of the longest drought sequences, which dem-
onstrates the variability in western water supplies.22
The U.S. Census Bureau reported population growth of 20 percent
for the State of New Mexico with the major metropolis, Albuquerque,
experiencing a 17 percent growth rate from 1990 to 2000.23 Recent popu-
lation estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau show a further growth rate
of 8 percent for New Mexico and 13 percent for Albuquerque from 2000
to 2007.24
As population continues to increase throughout the Middle Rio
Grande Basin and existing demands for traditional and environmental
water uses grow, the state is faced with a problem of how to satisfy each
20. We define the Middle Rio Grande Basin as the stretch of the Rio Grande located
just south of Cochiti Reservoir to just north of Elephant Butte Reservoir.
21. TreeFlow, Streamflow Reconstructions from Tree Rings, Rio Grande Basin, http://
treeflow.info/riogr/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2010). TreeFlow’s web resource on tree ring re-
constructions of streamflow and climate for the western United States is made available as
a collaborative effort of researchers affiliated with three NOAA-funded Regional Integrated
Sciences and Assessment (RISA) programs: Climate Assessment for the Southwest
(CLIMAS) Western Water Assessment, and the Climate Impacts Group, TreeFlow, About
TreeFlow, http://treeflow.info/about.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
22. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES DATA, SURFACE WATER MONTHLY STA-
TISTICS (2007).
23. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Finder, supra note 17. R
24. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 Population Estimates, supra note 18. R
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of these needs. In response, New Mexico has developed a state water
plan of which sections C2 and C9 call for a water transfer plan. Specifi-
cally, “the State must develop well-defined voluntary water rights mar-
kets that will allow the identification and dedication of existing water
rights to new uses either on a temporary or permanent basis.”25 In addi-
tion, “because water banks, when appropriately established and moni-
tored, allow the temporary re-allocation of water among voluntary water
bank participants without the need for a formal water rights transfer or a
change of ownership, they have the potential to provide an efficient and
timely alternative means to mitigate short-term shortages.”26 In the next
Part, we consider the challenges of designing a real time water leasing
system.
III. CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING A LEASING INSTITUTION
Much of the published literature on water markets examines the
permanent transfer of water rights via market transactions and has de-
tailed potential obstacles in designing a water market institution. We
summarize these potential obstacles into six keys issues in an effort to
inform a leasing market design that is based on the criteria that it be
efficient (with price as a robust signal), fair, transparent, voluntary, tem-
porally and spatially flexible, and responsive to hydrologic and engi-
neering reality. These six key issues involve the following: (1) well-
defined, securable, and tradable property rights; (2) hydrologic and engi-
neering reality; (3) environmental quality; (4) social/community and
traditional uses; (5) transaction costs; and (6) third-party effects (i.e., the
“no injury” rule).
For a water market to be effective, it must attempt to address most
of these issues. First, property rights must be well-defined and tradable;
they define the rules and relationships that individuals hold. Since
Ciriacy-Wantrup’s seminal article on the economic criteria for defining
water rights,27 other articles by Burness and Quirk,28 Brajer et al.,29 Mat-
25. See N.M. OFF. OF THE ST. ENG’R, supra note 5, at 16. R
26. See NEV. DIV. OF WATER RES., supra note 6, at 45. R
27. S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water
Rights, in LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES: PAPERS AND PROCEED-
INGS OF A SYMPOSIUM HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., OCTOBER, 1956 531 (David Haber & Ste-
phen W. Bergen eds., 1958).
28. H. Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Effi-
ciency: The Colorado River, 23 J.L. & ECON. 111 (1980).
29. Victor Brajer et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as They Affect
Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 489 (1989).
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thews,30 and Slaughter and Wiener31 have discussed the need for changes
to address the shortcomings of the appropriative rights system utilized
in the western United States. The general consensus from these articles is
that well-defined property rights will encourage individuals to seek out
activities that will enhance the right holders’ position. These activities
can include, but are not limited to, temporary transfers within and across
user groups.
The second issue of transaction costs arises from incurred costs of
designing the institution and the costs incurred in transferring water.
Transaction costs are generally characterized as any factor that can pre-
vent a market from operating efficiently or from forming.32 Large trans-
action costs can reflect multiple economic benefits of water and can also
reflect the scarcity value of water. As Howe and Goemans33 have found,
transaction costs are higher in a water market with traditional water
rights than they are in a proportional shares market. High transaction
costs lead to fewer, albeit larger, average transfers. Because transaction
costs can limit or even prohibit market transactions, one must acknowl-
edge their existence in designing institutions and be able to predict these
costs to inform decision-making and improve policy decisions, as Colby34
and McCann and Easter35 explain.
The third issue of hydrologic and engineering reality requires the
use of a hydrologic model to determine when and where water is availa-
ble, the impacts of market transfers upon the physical system, and
whether it is physically possible to deliver the leased water. Anderson
and Leal36 address the need for incorporating the hydrology of the region
into a market institution, while Matthews37 explains why a market insti-
tution must address hydrologic reality. Currently, new and innovative
30. Olen Paul Matthews, Fundamental Questions About Water Rights and Market Realloca-
tion, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09S08 (2004).
31. Richard A. Slaughter & John D. Wiener, Water, Adaptation, and Property Rights on
the Snake and Klamath Rivers, 43 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 308 (2007).
32. Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1184, 1186 (1990).
33. Charles Howe & Christopher Goemans, Water Transfers and Their Impacts: Lessons
from Three Colorado Water Markets, 39 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 1055, 1064 (2003).
34. Bonnie G. Colby, Cap-and-Trade Policy Challenges: A Tale of Three Markets, 76 LAND
ECON. 638, 652 (2000).
35. Laura McCann & K. William Easter, A Framework for Estimating the Transaction
Costs of Alternative Mechanisms for Water Exchange and Allocation, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. 6
W09S09 (2004).
36. Terry Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Building Coalitions for Water Marketing, 8 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 432, 434–36 (1989).
37. See Matthews, supra note 30, at 5. R
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approaches are being used to ensure that the hydrology of systems is
recognized in reallocating water.38
Fourth, environmental quality concerns, such as maintaining in-
stream flows to protect the natural system, are researched by Colby,39
Colby,40 Griffin and Hsu,41 Lovell et al.,42 Green and O’Connor,43 Weber,44
Landry,45 and Burke et al.46 In general, these articles detail the value of
instream flows while examining a water market institution as a possible
mechanism to meet environmental quality goals. This growing literature
displays the need to include environmental quality goals in the design of
a market to capture the value of environmental amenities. From this
literature there are two possible methods of including these goals: either
allocate water rights to environmental trustees and allow them to partici-
pate in market transactions, or design the market to include environmen-
tal goals as constraints.
Fifth, concerns exist over social/community and traditional uses
of water. These uses have not received as much attention in the literature
as environmental quality even though they are some of the oldest issues
that exist in designing markets, as first explained by Trelease47 and as
later explained by Brajer and Martin48 and Seldin.49 In New Mexico,
traditional values are of great importance because 23 Native American
tribes and pueblos exist in the Rio Grande Basin. These social/commu-
38. See Olen Paul Matthews et al., Marketing Western Water: Can a Process Based Geo-
graphic Information System Improve Reallocation Decisions?, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329 (2001).
39. Bonnie G. Colby, Estimating the Value of Water in Alternative Uses, 29 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 511 (1989).
40. Bonnie G. Colby, Enhancing Instream Flow Benefits in an Era of Water Marketing, 26
WATER RESOURCES RES. 1113 (1990).
41. Ronald C. Griffin & Shih-Hsun Hsu, The Potential for Water Market Efficiency When
Instream Flows Have Value, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 292 (1993).
42. S. Lovell et al., Using Water Markets to Improve Environmental Quality: Two Innovative
Programs in Nevada, 55 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 19 (2000).
43. Gareth P. Green & John P. O’Connor, Water Banking and Restoration of Endangered
Species Habitat: An Application to the Snake River, 19 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 225 (2001).
44. Marian L. Weber, Markets for Water Rights Under Environmental Constraints, 42 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 53 (2001).
45. Clay Landry, Buy that Fish a Drink: The United States’ Approach to Environmental
Protection in an Era of Water Marketing, 12 WATER L. 240 (2001).
46. Susan M. Burke et al., Water Banks and Environmental Water Demands: Case of the
Klamath Project, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09S02 (2004).
47. Frank J. Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1965).
48. Victor Brajer & Wade E. Martin, Water Rights Markets: Social and Legal Considera-
tions, 49 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 35 (1990).
49. Chris Seldin, Interstate Marketing of Indian Water Rights: The Impact of the Commerce
Clause, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1545 (1999).
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nity and traditional uses (i.e., Native American rights, acequias, and pub-
lic uses) must be considered to ensure that all users are properly
represented within the market.
The final issue relates to third-party effects that arise from market
transfers. Third-party effects can take multiple forms but are generally a
function of return flows from irrigated agriculture as explained by
Gould.50 These effects have the potential to limit market transactions or
block transactions if left unaddressed. In dealing with these effects, some
states have incorporated a “no-injury” rule when it comes to water trans-
fers.51 “No-injury” rules are designed so that a water transfer cannot
cause economic harm to other parties. Including these effects in the de-
sign of the market is necessary to ensure that transactions can occur, as
Gisser,52 Anderson,53 Gould,54 and Dragun and Gleeson55 explain.
IV. REVIEW OF WATER LEASING MARKETS
The utilization of a market to conduct formal leasing of water
rights has received attention since Howe et al.,56 Howe et al.,57 and
Gould58 dedicated sections of their articles to temporary water rights
transfers. Since then, articles have been published detailing: the benefits
of water leasing in the hydropower industry by Hamilton et al.,59 envi-
ronmental purposes by Turner and Perry;60 agricultural practices by
50. George A. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457, 463 (1989)
[hereinafter Gould, Transfer of Water Rights].
51. See id. at 463–68.
52. Micha Gisser, Groundwater: Focusing on the Real Issue, 91 J. POL. ECON. 1001, 1016–18
(1983).
53. Terry L. Anderson, The Market Alternative for Hawaiian Water, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J.
893, 898 (1985).
54. George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 1, 13–22 (1988).
55. Andrew K. Dragun & Victor Gleeson, From Water Law to Transferability in New
South Wales, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 653–56 (1989).
56. Charles W. Howe, Paul K. Alexander & Raphael J. Moses, The Performance of Appro-
priative Water Rights Systems in the Western United States During Drought, 22 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 379, 384 (1982).
57. Charles W. Howe, Dennis R. Schurmeier & W. Douglas Shaw, Jr., Innovative Ap-
proaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439,
443 (1986).
58. See Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, supra note 50. R
59. Joel R. Hamilton et al., Interruptible Water Markets in the Pacific Northwest, 71 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 63 (1989).
60. Brenda Turner & Gregory M. Perry, Agriculture to Instream Water Transfers Under
Uncertain Water Availability: A Case Study of the Deschutes River, Oregon, 22 J. AGRIC. & RE-
SOURCE ECON. 208 (1997).
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Calatrava and Garrido;61 municipal use by Smith and Marin,62 Characklis
et al.,63 and Characklis et al.;64 and the preexisting conditions of a water
market institution and its evolution by Carey and Sunding,65 Howe and
Goemans,66 and Calatrava and Garrido.67 Further, Shupe et al.68 supports
a water leasing market and describes how it “can be an attractive option
for both parties because it maintains continuity, preserves ownership by
the holder of the right for future use, and accommodates an intermediate
use. . . .”
In addition to these theoretical studies, empirical studies have an-
alyzed the available price data for permanent and temporary water
rights transfers in the western United States and southeastern Australia.
Articles concerning the western United States by Yoskowitz,69
Czetwertynski,70 Yoskowitz,71 Loomis et al.,72 Adams et al.,73 Howitt and
Hansen,74 Brown,75 and Brewer76 typically analyze temporary transfers
61. Javier Calatrava & Alberto Garrido, Spot Water Markets and Risk in Water Supply, 33
AGRIC. ECON. 131 (2005).
62. Mark Griffin Smith & Carlos M. Marin, Analysis of Short-Run Domestic Water Supply
Transfers Under Uncertainty, 29 WATER RESOURCES RES. 2909 (1993).
63. Gregory W. Characklis et al., Improving the Ability of a Water Market to Efficiently
Manage Drought, 35 WATER RESOURCES RES. 823 (1999).
64. Gregory W. Characklis et al., Developing Portfolios of Water Supply Transfers, 42
WATER RESOURCES RES. W05403 (2006).
65. Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative Insti-
tutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 283 (2001).
66. See Howe & Goemans, supra note 33. R
67. Javier Calatrava & Alberto Garrido, Difficulties in Adopting Formal Water Trading
Rules Within Users’ Associations, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 27 (2006).
68. Steven J. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation 29 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 413, 417 (1989).
69. David W. Yoskowitz, Spot Market for Water Along the Texas Rio Grande: Opportunities
for Water Management, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 345 (1999).
70. MARIELLA CZETWERTYNSKI, THE SALE AND LEASING OF WATER RIGHTS IN WESTERN
STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR THE PERIOD 1990–2001 (2002) (Water Policy Working Paper
#2002-002, Ga. St. Univ.), available at http://www.h2opolicycenter.org/pdf_documents/
water_workingpapers/2002_002.pdf.
71. David W. Yoskowitz, Price Dispersion and Price Discrimination: Empirical Evidence
from a Spot Market for Water, 20 REV. INDUS. ORG. 283 (2002).
72. John B. Loomis et al., Expanding Institutional Arrangements for Acquiring Water for
Environmental Purposes: Transactions Evidence for the Western United States, 19 WATER RE-
SOURCES DEV. 21 (2003).
73. JENNIFER ADAMS ET AL., THE SALE AND LEASING OF WATER RIGHTS IN WESTERN
STATES: AN UPDATE TO MID-2003 (2004) (Water Policy Working Paper No. 2004-004, Ga. St.
Univ.), available at http://www.h2opolicycenter.org/pdf_documents/water_workingpa-
pers/2004-004.pdf.
74. Richard Howitt & Kristiana Hansen, The Evolving Western Water Markets, 20
CHOICES 1, 59–63 (2005).
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for the entire western region because the available data is not rich
enough to analyze each basin independently, except for water markets in
the Lower Rio Grande in Texas, the Central Valley Project, and the pro-
portional shares market for the Colorado Big Thompson (CBT).77
Articles concerning southeastern Australia by Crase et al.,78 Bjor-
nlund,79 Bjornlund,80 Crase et al.,81 and Turral et al.82 differ from the arti-
cles covering the western United States as they analyze permanent and
temporary water rights transfers in one basin, the Murray-Darling Basin.
Each of the five articles for southeastern Australia utilizes existing data
to provide empirical insights for the Basin as a whole83 or for one specific
state within the Basin.84 The data available for southeastern Australia
contains a larger number of transactions on a basin scale than the data
available for the western United States.85 This richer data for southeast-
ern Australia allows for an examination of a market for one specific basin
rather than a large region with different physical conditions, as is the
case for the western United States.
The final empirical study for temporary water rights markets is by
Hadjigeorgalis and Lillywhite86 in northern Chile. They analyze the dif-
ferences in homogenous water rights across irrigation districts and find
75. Thomas C. Brown, Trends in Water Market Activity and Price in the Western United
States, 42 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09402 (2006).
76. JEDIDIAH BREWER ET AL., WATER MARKETS IN THE WEST: PRICES, TRADING, AND CON-
TRACTUAL FORMS 1 (2007) (Working Paper Series No. 13002, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res.).
77. Data from these studies is predominately available from the journal, Water Strate-
gist, published by Stratecon, Inc. Only Yoskowitz’s data comes from another source—the
Rio Grande Water Masters Office.
78. Lin Crase et al., Water Markets as a Vehicle for Water Reform: the Case of New South
Wales, 44 AUSTRALIAN J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 299 (2000).
79. Henning Bjornlund, Farmer Participation in Markets for Temporary and Permanent
Water in Southeastern Australia, 63 AGRIC. WATER MGMT. 57 (2003).
80. Henning Bjornlund, Formal and Informal Water Markets: Drivers of Sustainable Rural
Communities? 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09S07 (2004).
81. Lin Crase et al., Water Markets as a Vehicle for Reforming Water Resources Allocation in
the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W08S05 (2004). [hereinafter
Crase et al., Murray-Darling Basin of Australia].
82. H.N. Turral et al., Water Trading at the Margin: The Evolution of Water Markets in the
Murray-Darling Basin, 41 WATER RESOURCES RES. W07011 (2005).
83. See id.; see also Bjornlund, supra note 79; Bjornlund, supra note 80; Crase et al., supra R
note 78. R
84. See Crase et al., supra note 78. R
85. The data for these studies comes from personal contact with the Water Analysis
and Audit Unit, the Department of Natural Resources and Environment, and the
Goulburn-Murray Water Register.
86. Ereney Hadjigeorgalis & Jay Lillywhite, The Impact of Institutional Constraints on the
Limari River Valley Water Market, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W05501 (2004).
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that water rights are tied to property rights. This attachment to property
rights prohibits the sale or leasing of water rights across different basins.
Collectively, these empirical studies demonstrate the attention
that water leasing has been receiving on a national and international ba-
sis. Concerns about water availability are not unique to the western
United States; rather, these concerns exist throughout the world. Each of
these empirical studies is summarized in Table 1 (above).
While these studies represent a significant advancement in under-
standing current water marketing practices in the western United States,
southeastern Australia, and northern Chile, the water markets they ad-
dress lack the coupled modeling components that allow for an examina-
tion of the impact of temporary water rights transfers upon the natural
and physical setting. Further, these water markets are situations where
most transfers experience long lags in the approval process that often
deter potential participants from entering the marketplace. Current stud-
ies have typically focused on trades within a sector (i.e., agriculture, in-
dustry, environment, urban) and rarely on trades between sectors, and
have not incorporated the natural and physical setting into the market
studies. In what follows, we present a market design that addresses
many of the issues raised in the aforementioned literature.
V. MARKET DESIGN
Recognizing the limitations of current temporary transfer markets
described in Part IV and the issues in designing a market institution as
outlined in Part III, we develop a coupled market utilizing the Middle
Rio Grande Basin as a backdrop from which to capture the natural and
physical dynamics in a hydrologic model that is then coupled with a
market framework to create a prototype water leasing market. This
model is based upon the six issues set forth in Part III and explicitly
incorporates the following four issues: (1) well-defined property rights;
(2) hydrologic and engineering reality; (3) environmental quality; and (4)
inclusion of social/community and traditional uses into the hydrologic
model and trading market. This type of market design is unique in that it
presents water managers with flexibility in planning, as the natural,
physical, and engineering dynamics of the region are coupled with its
behavioral characteristics.
The objective of this model is to address the feasibility of a water
leasing market using the techniques of experimental economics.87 A
properly designed experiment will be salient and have parallelism,
meaning it is realistic to the participants and replicates the decision-mak-
87. See DOUGLAS D. DAVIS & CHARLES A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (1993).
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FIGURE 1: SCHEMATIC OF THE HYDROLOGIC MODEL FOR
ONE REACH OF THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE
ing process as closely as possible.88 To ensure saliency and parallelism in
the coupled market, the natural, physical, and engineering dynamics of
the Middle Rio Grande Basin are modeled through three steps. The first
step is to create a hydrologic model that simulates the physical dynamics
of the Middle Rio Grande Basin. The second step is to obtain outputs for
the amount of water available in the region under different climatic con-
ditions using the developed hydrologic model. The third step is to inte-
grate these outputs with a marketplace where student subjects motivated
by monetary payoffs are allowed to trade water with other participants
as they seek to maximize their own monetary reward.
This design process is unique and robust; previous research has
not utilized a coupled model to design a water market to the best of our
knowledge, and the model reports data for the number of transactions
during each round and provides detailed information on individual
88. See id. at 14–18.
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trades. Data obtained includes who is engaging in each transaction, the
amount of water being traded, the price per acre-foot, and the impact of
these transactions upon the physical system.
The outputs of this coupled model allow for a full examination of
the efficiency of a prototype water leasing market. For a water leasing
market to be efficient, it should have minimal impact upon the natural
and physical system and the observed market price should not be statis-
tically different from the expected market price. The hydrologic outputs
detail the impact of market transactions upon the physical system, and
because of the use of induced values,89 the observed price per acre-foot
can be tested against the value given to the participants (expected price).
In developing the first step—designing a model that addresses
hydrologic and engineering reality—we base the model upon the physi-
cal dynamics of the Middle Rio Grande Basin. The region is subdivided
into six distinct reaches delineated by the major gages on the Rio Grande.
The basic hydrologic model elements include surface and groundwater
supplies balanced against municipal, agricultural, environmental, and
Native American demands (Figure 1, above). Surface inflows include the
main stem of the Rio Grande, tributary flows, inter-basin transfers from
the Colorado River, and wastewater returns. Losses from the surface
water system include evaporation from the river, transpiration from the
riparian corridor, groundwater-pumping-induced river leakage, and ag-
ricultural, municipal, and Native American consumption. Groundwater
inflows include mountain-front recharge, inter-basin flows and river
leakage, while withdrawals include groundwater pumping and dis-
charge to the river and shallow aquifer.
Evaporative losses from the river are a function of climatic condi-
tions, while river leakage is a function of river discharge and ground-
water pumping. The sum of these gains or losses is denoted as carriage
gains/losses. The model accounts for these carriage gains/losses at the
reach-specific scale. As water is traded across reaches, carriage gains/
losses are tracked and assessed to the lessee’s trade. Tracking carriage
gains/losses adds a spatial component to the marketplace. Carriage
gains/losses are assessed on a per-acre-foot-of-water-traded basis and
are calculated for each reach based on 25-year averages and taken as
constants to facilitate their representation in market transactions. Our ex-
pectation is that including carriage gains/losses in the marketplace will
89. Induced values reflect the structure of an experiment whereby individual partici-
pants in the market experiment are told how much each unit (in this case, an acre-foot of
water) is worth to them. These induced values (expected values) can then be compared
against the behavior of the participant.
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FIGURE 2: LAYOUT OF USERS
motivate participants to lease water upstream in order to capture water
that otherwise would be lost.
The second step is to run the hydrologic model to determine how
much water is available for a growing season. The hydrologic model de-
veloped in the first step is based upon historic gage data for the region.
Water for the basin originates in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado dur-
ing the winter months as snowpack. The Rio Grande Compact90 has been
established between the three states that draw water from the Rio
90. Rio Grande Compact (1938), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-23 (2008), Act of May 31,
1939, ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785, available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/ISC/ISC-Com-
pacts/Rio_Grande_Compact.pdf.
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Grande (Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas). In any given year the
formula determines the allocation of water for the Middle Rio Grande
Basin. The formula uses four stream gages in the Rocky Mountains of
Colorado to determine snowpack runoff. From this runoff, Colorado is
committed to deliver quantities of water at different times throughout
the year depending upon the quantity of water calculated from the four
stream gages. Using the historic water data, the hydrologic model is run
to determine the amount and availability of water to each of the partici-
pants in the market experiments. The outputs of these hydrologic model
runs represent the initial allocations for users in the experiments.
The third step is to integrate the outputs of the hydrologic model
(initial conditions) into a marketplace where participants can seek out
transactions to maximize their monetary reward. The marketplace is a
simplistic representation of how water rights are distributed throughout
the six reaches of the region (Figure 2, above). Aggregating all water
rights in the region into four distinct categories—irrigated agriculture
(A), municipalities (U), environmental (E), and Native American (NA)—
creates 15 different representative traders in the marketplace. Before par-
ticipants are allowed to engage in transactions, the first run of the hydro-
logic model is performed to determine the initial allocation of water to
each user. Market trading is then allowed where water rights are as-
sumed to be homogenous.91 The coupling of the hydrologic model into
the marketplace allows the model to track specific users who are engag-
ing in transactions and the magnitude of each transaction. After trading
concludes for a round, the hydrologic model performs a second run to
determine the impact of market transactions upon the physical setting
(i.e., carriage gains/losses). This same process is carried out for 10 trad-
ing periods.
The double auction market framework is utilized to facilitate mar-
ket transactions.92 This framework displays all bids and offers simultane-
ously and all transactions for the current round to all participants via an
online trading interface. A transaction is formalized in the market when
two individuals voluntarily agree upon a standing price and quantity.
Each participant is motivated to maximize his or her monetary payout
91. We assume homogeneity of water rights for the experiments based upon the New
Mexico Regional Water plan where the bulk of the water rights for the basin are presumed
to be pre-1907 water rights. See WATER ASSEMBLY, MID-REGION COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS,
MIDDLE RIO GRANDE REGIONAL WATER PLAN 2000–2050, chs. 2, 5 (2004), available at http://
www.waterassembly.org/waterplan.htm.
92. There are other market frameworks that could facilitate transactions. The double
auction framework is employed because it leads to robust predictions of the competitive
price when compared to other market frameworks. See Vernon L. Smith, An Experimental
Study of Competitive Market Behavior, 70 J. POL. ECON. 111 (1962).
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by deciding how to utilize the water allotment given to him or her. Par-
ticipants are given three choices: first, they can use their water allotment
to fulfill the specific interests of the user they are assigned; second, they
can lease water to other users; or third, they can lease water from other
users. Participants are able to choose among these three alternatives in
the manner they believe will best maximize their own monetary payout.
Participants are allowed to engage in as many transactions as they desire
during each round with the constraint that participants cannot trade
more water than they are allotted and they cannot have negative dollar
balances.
Each of the user groups was given a unique payout93 and de-
mand94 function. Upon a review of the water demand literature for the
western United States we found the highest value use of water to be in
the urban or municipal sector followed by the environmental sector and
agriculture. The payout and demand functions that follow are a repre-
sentation of the activities that dominate(d) each of the main user groups
in the Middle Rio Grande Basin based upon the highest-valued-use hier-
archy. Thus, we have represented, to the best of our ability, the major
user groups in the Middle Rio Grande Basin by constructing demand
and payout functions for each of the user groups based upon the highest-
valued-use hierarchy. We assume that irrigators and Native American
users are engaging in irrigated agricultural practices, and that these
users need a minimum amount of water for crop production. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the payout and demand functions for these two
users are the same.95 Participants who represent environmental interests
receive different payout and demand functions than the agricultural
users.96 These users are modeled as protecting environmental interests
such as endangered species or riparian habitat. Unlike the previous three
user groups, the municipal user is given a positively sloped payout func-
93. A payout function displays the relationship between the dollars a participant can
earn and the amount of water in acre-feet necessary to earn those dollars.
94. A demand function displays the relationship between the amounts of money a
participant is willing to spend to obtain a specific quantity in acre-feet of water.
95. If these participants achieved 3 acre-feet, they would be paid $9, anything less then
3 acre-feet would yield them a payout of $0. These participants’ demand function told
them that they should be willing to pay up to $3 per acre-foot to achieve the 3 acre-feet
necessary to obtain a $9 payout.
96. If these participants achieve 2 acre-feet, they would receive a payout of $10 and
anything less then 2 acre-feet would result in a punishment of $1. The demand function for
these participants told them they should be willing to pay $5 per acre-foot to obtain the 2
acre-feet and the $10 payout to avoid the $1 punishment.
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tion and a downward-sloping demand function97 rather than simple step
functions.98 This urban user is modeled to incorporate the metropolis of
Albuquerque and its outlying municipalities. Lumping all these munici-
palities creates one large urban user in the experimental marketplace.
Due to the different marginal values99 of water that are con-
structed for the different user groups from the payout and demand func-
tions, we expect to observe price differentials between the four user
groups if we do not allow arbitrage100 in the market. As Gary D. Libecap
explains, “the persistence of large water price differentials between agri-
cultural and urban and environmental uses reflects the lack of extensive,
routine market trades that would otherwise arbitrage to narrow those
differences.”101 For simplicity in these market experiments, we allow for
arbitrage and incorporate homogenous102 water rights rather than a pri-
ority rights structure. We expect that the marketplace will function
smoothly, narrowing price differentials between the different user
groups, leading to a uniform market price.
Market experiments were conducted over the summer of 2005 us-
ing student subjects at the University of New Mexico. Twelve experi-
mental sessions were conducted under four climatic scenarios
(baseline,103 decreasing,104 increasing,105 and dry106) with three sessions
per scenario. Under each scenario, participants were not given a forecast
97. This participant was given a positive sloped payout function of $ = 8*acre-
feet–(acre-feet)^3/2 showing diminishing marginal returns for each acre-foot obtained. The
demand function for this participant is Price = 8–(acre-feet)^0.5.
98. A step function is a function only on real numbers, also known as a staircase func-
tion. The payout and demand functions for the agricultural, Native American, and environ-
mental user groups are step functions.
99. A marginal value is the value associated with a one-unit (acre-foot) change.
100. We define “arbitrage” here as meaning that participants are allowed to purchase
and re-sell water without actually putting the water to “beneficial use.”
101. GARY D. LIBECAP, THE PROBLEM OF WATER 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research &
Hoover Inst. 2005), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2006/0108_
1300_0702.pdf.
102. We define a homogenous water right to be a water right where all rights holders
have the same priority date.
103. The baseline scenario provides a representation of average water years for the ba-
sin where participants were given an initial allotment that would allow them to fulfill their
specific interests.
104. The decreasing scenario represents the basin entering a drought, where the initial
allotment starts above the baseline allotment and ends below the baseline allotment.
105. The increasing scenario represents the basin exiting a drought, where the initial
allotment starts below the baseline allotment and ends above the baseline allotment.
106. The dry scenario represents a prolonged drought where participants are given an
initial allotment that is below the allotment needed each period to fulfill their specific
users’ interests.
\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3407.txt unknown Seq: 21 17-JUN-10 8:57
Summer-Fall 2009] WATER LEASING 727
of what the future might hold; rather, the future was left uncertain. In
total, 180 individuals participated in the market experiments.
The market reports the number of transactions each trading pe-
riod and details information on individual trades such as who engaged
in the transaction, the amount of water traded, the price per acre-foot,
and the impact of water trading upon the physical system, all within the
context of alternative climatic scenarios. Using a Student t-test107 we are
able to test the observed market price against the expected or induced
market price for each user group and for the market as a whole.
VI. RESULTS
Due to space considerations, the results of the market experiments
are presented for each scenario rather than for each individual experi-
ment. The first result of the market experiments is the number of lease
transactions in which each user group engaged and the volume of water
that was leased from these transactions. Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 report the
number of lease transactions and the volume of water traded from these
transactions for the agricultural, environmental, Native American, and
urban users, respectively. Each of these tables reports the transactions
and volume of water leased by the respective user groups from other
user groups for each of the four different climatic scenarios. For example,
Table 2 (APPENDIX) displays from whom the participants representing
agricultural users leased water (i.e., other agricultural, environmental,
Native American, or urban users).
The findings shown in Table 2 suggest that while the participants
representing agricultural users engaged in multiple transactions with the
other user groups, the bulk of these transactions occurred with the par-
ticipants representing environmental users. In addition, these agricul-
tural users leased more water when water was scarce in the decreasing
and dry scenarios than when water was abundant in the increasing and
baseline scenarios. This finding may be a result of these participants
seeking to fulfill their specific user interests from their payout functions
rather then just arbitraging water.
Table 3 (APPENDIX) illustrates that while the participants repre-
senting environmental users engaged in multiple transactions with the
other user groups, the majority of environmental users’ transactions oc-
107. The test statistic is
X¯−m0
t =
s/√n
where X¯ is the observed weighted average price, m0 is the expected market equilibrium, s is
the standard deviation, and n is the sample size.
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curred with other environmental participants. Some large rounds of
trading occurred at the start of each scenario with the agricultural users,
and a large number of transactions occurred with the Native American
users throughout the baseline scenario. The volume of lease transactions
was relatively constant for the environmental users, indicating that envi-
ronmental users tried to fulfill their specific user interests from their pay-
out functions in water scarce years and arbitraging water when water
was plentiful.
Table 4 (APPENDIX) illustrates that while the participants repre-
senting Native American users engaged in multiple transactions across
the user groups, the majority of their lease transactions occurred with the
agricultural and environmental users. In addition, these participants en-
gaged in more transactions with a larger volume of water being leased
when water was scarce in the decreasing and dry scenarios as these par-
ticipants sought to fulfill their specific user interests from their payout
functions.
Table 5 (APPENDIX) illustrates that while the participants repre-
senting urban users engaged in multiple transactions with the other
users, the volume of these lease transactions is relatively small when
compared to the lease transactions by the other user groups displayed in
Tables 2, 3, and 4. These urban representative participants engaged in
more lease transactions with a larger volume of water traded when
water was plentiful in the baseline and increasing scenario, and with
fewer transactions and a smaller volume of water traded in the water
scarce years of the decreasing and dry scenarios.
Of interest from the transactions summarized is whether water is
captured and put to use as a result of market transactions. Specifically, if
trades tend to move water use upstream, then less water is lost to evapo-
ration and river leakage (i.e., carriage loss), making more water available
for use.
Figure 3 (APPENDIX) displays the aggregate carriage gains/losses
as a percent of the water available to participants at the beginning of
each trading round. Our expectation was that the inclusion of carriage
losses would result in water being traded upstream rather than down-
stream, which would result in more water available. The results in Fig-
ure 3 demonstrate that this expectation does not hold true. Rather, we
find carriage losses in five of the 10 periods for the decreasing scenario,
six of the 10 periods for the dry scenario, four of the 10 periods for the
increasing scenario, and six of the 10 periods for the baseline scenario.
However, these losses are minimal; the largest loss—close to 5 percent of
the total water allocated to the participants—is found in the baseline sce-
nario, trading period four, while the largest gain—close to 2 percent of
total water allocated to the participants—is found in the last round of the
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increasing scenario. While we expected to see carriage gains from market
transactions, we find mixed results leading us to believe that the price
per acre-foot was a larger determining factor in how water was traded
than was the inclusion of carriage gains/losses in the marketplace. How-
ever, these carriage gains/losses are relatively small, thus displaying
minimal impact upon the natural and physical system.
Figure 4 (APPENDIX) displays the change in water delivered for
each of the six river reaches as a result of market transactions. For exam-
ple, in round one of the dry scenario, users in reach one observed a 9
percent decrease in water use relative to their initial allocation. This
means that the participants in this reach leased 9 percent of their total
water allocation to other reaches. At the same time, users in reach six
utilized 25 percent more water than their initial allocation. This means
that the users in this reach leased 25 percent more water than they were
allocated. Figure 4 displays the movement of water on a reach-specific
basis for rounds one, four, seven, and 10 of market trading for the four
scenarios. The results shown in Figure 4 suggest that the market transac-
tions lead to a redistribution of water throughout the basin. That is, some
reaches end up using more water while others use less, and there does
not appear to be any strong redistribution trends across the different
scenarios.
Table 6 (APPENDIX) summarizes the results for the weighted aver-
age price per acre-foot for each of the user groups by scenario. From the
way the market was constructed, it was expected that if price differen-
tials did exist, participants who represented agricultural users and Na-
tive American users would be willing to pay three dollars per acre-foot,
while participants who represented environmental interests would be
willing to pay five dollars per acre-foot. The willingness to pay for each
acre-foot for a participant representing urban users was dependent upon
the amount of water that participant was seeking to obtain. However, if a
unique market price per acre-foot does exist, we would expect this
unique price to fluctuate depending upon the supply of water allocated
to the participants in the different scenarios and to minimize the price
differential between user groups.
A Student t-test is used to test the hypothesis that the observed
weighted average price for each of the user groups is equal to the ex-
pected price for these user groups. The results of these tests are dis-
played in Table 6. If the observed weighted average price is significant,
then we are able to reject this hypothesis, concluding that the observed
price is different from the expected price, meaning that the participants
did not effectively take on the role of the user group they were assigned.
As illustrated in Table 6, the participants who represented agricul-
tural users effectively took on their assigned role in the baseline and de-
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creasing scenarios; however, in the dry and increasing scenarios the
observed price was significantly different from the expected price. This
could be due to the scarcity of water in the dry and increasing scenarios.
Participants who represented Native American users effectively took on
their assigned role in the baseline scenario; however, the results are
mixed in the dry, decreasing, and increasing scenarios. Again, these re-
sults may be mixed due to the scarcity of water in some of these scena-
rios, driving the observed market price higher. Participants who
represented the environmental users effectively took on their assigned
role in the baseline and dry scenarios, but exhibited mixed results in the
increasing and decreasing scenarios. Finally, participants representing
the urban users effectively took on their assigned role in the baseline
scenario with mixed results in the dry scenario and only one insignifi-
cant finding in the decreasing and increasing scenarios. The mixed re-
sults by each of the users groups could be attributed to the scarcity of
water in the water scarce scenarios.
To fully examine whether price differentials were present in the
marketplace, the observed market price is compared to the expected
market price.108 Table 7 (APPENDIX) presents the observed market prices
with their associated standard errors. A Student t-test was used to test
the hypothesis that the observed market price equals the expected mar-
ket price. Rejecting this hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the ob-
served market price does not equal expectations, which could be a sign
that price differentials do exist. The results in Table 7 illustrate that this
hypothesis can only be rejected in three instances in the decreasing, dry,
and increasing scenarios. All of these instances occur when water is
scarce except for round four of the decreasing scenario and round six of
the increasing scenario, meaning that in water scarce years participants
tend to pay a higher price for water due to the scarcity of the resource.
The results of Table 7 in conjunction with the results of Table 6
suggest that price differentials exist in very few instances, meaning that
the inclusion of homogenous water rights allowing for arbitrage did, in
fact, narrow price differentials, and that the marketplace is efficient in
most instances where participants effectively took on the role of their
assigned user groups. The instances where participants did not effec-
tively take on the role of their assigned user groups typically occurred in
periods of water scarcity.
While these results are based upon the empirical realities de-
scribed in Part V, we realize that not all property rights are well defined
and would foresee the price formation process changing in the market-
108. The expected market price is obtained by horizontally summing the demand func-
tions of each user group.
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place as property rights are better defined. Better-defined property rights
should lead to more transactions, which should lead to lower prices and
higher levels of economic welfare gains. Thus, the breadth of the market
will expand with and parallel the breadth of the established property
rights.
In addition, we have assumed in our experimental work that our
subjects are motivated to maximize their own monetary reward. There
are times in real situations where other non-monetary values may be ex-
pressed and could influence the prices observed in the actual market-
place. For example, traditional agricultural users and Native American
users may have cultural and spiritual values for water. These values
could lead these users to be less likely to participate in market transac-
tions. Fewer transactions would result in less water brought to the mar-
ketplace, a higher market price, and lower levels of economic welfare
gains then observed in our experimental treatments.
Further, in our experimental treatments we placed an environ-
mental user in each reach of the river that was modeled to protect in-
stream flows and/or riparian habitat protection for that reach of the
river. Different outcomes would occur in the market if fewer environ-
mental users were placed in the system, and these outcomes would de-
pend upon the placing of these users. For instance, if only one
environmental user is placed in the market and they are in the sixth
reach—or the bottom of the river—any leasing of water by this user from
other users would result in a minimum instream flow goal being met
throughout the river system. However, if this user is placed in the first
reach—or the top of the river—any leasing of water by this user from
other users would ensure a minimum instream flow goal for that reach
only. While the placement of the environmental user has implications
upon the system, the number of environmental users placed in the sys-
tem also has an effect. With fewer environmental users, less water is
brought to the market, leading to a higher market price and lower eco-
nomic welfare gains then observed in our experimental treatments.
Finally, the institution presented in this article is only one type of
institution in which transactions could occur. In reality, the water users
in the Middle Rio Grande Basin may prefer a modified structure of these
institutional rules. The important factor is that many market institutions
have been shown to increase the efficiency of resource utilization and
allocation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
As populations continue to grow in the western United States,
there will be increased pressure on already scarce water resources to ful-
fill municipal, environmental, irrigated agriculture, cultural, and tradi-
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tional uses. Water managers will need flexibility in planning to ensure
that these demands are met with minimal conflict. Allowing for the leas-
ing of water rights through coupled markets that recognize the natural,
physical, and engineering dynamics of the system and include behav-
ioral characteristics of market participants is one possible mechanism to
provide water managers with flexibility.
In this research, a hydrologic model is developed using the Mid-
dle Rio Grande Basin in central New Mexico as a backdrop, and the out-
puts of this prototype model are coupled within a water leasing market
framework to create a prototype market in which to better understand
the impact of lease transactions upon the natural, physical, and engineer-
ing system. From this marketplace we are able to gather rich data to
demonstrate the minimal impact of water leasing upon the basin and the
efficiency of the market when arbitrage is allowed using homogenous
water rights.
While this model is based upon the hydrologic and economic real-
ities of the Middle Rio Grande Basin, it provides insights into the poten-
tial for a water leasing market for any basin. We caution against the
broad use of our model in other basins, since a water leasing market for
any basin needs to be based upon the hydrologic realities of that particu-
lar basin. However, the results of a leasing market in other basins should
lead to similar results observed in our model, again noting the breadth of
the market will expand with and parallel the breadth of established
property rights.
In this article, six primary issues are identified in designing a
water market from existing literature: well-defined property rights, hy-
drologic reality, environmental quality, social/community and tradi-
tional uses, transaction costs, and third-party effects. The prototype
marketplace developed here is designed specifically to address four of
these issues: well-defined property rights, hydrologic reality, environ-
mental quality, and social/community and traditional uses. Further re-
search is necessary to fully understand how the issues of transaction
costs and third-party effects might inhibit or limit transfers. While the
redistribution of water from market transactions has the potential to in-
duce third-party effects, adjustment of reservoir and ditch delivery
schedules may be sufficient to satisfy instream flow and water deliveries
challenged by market transactions. Further research is necessary to truly
understand these third-party effects and possible mechanisms for
amelioration.
In conclusion, this research demonstrates the effectiveness of in-
corporating the outputs of the natural, physical, and engineering system
with the behavioral characteristics of a basin’s users into a prototype
marketplace. Findings demonstrate the impact of transactions upon the
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physical system to be minimal as carriage gains/losses are generally at
or below 1 percent of the initial allocation to the system. In addition, the
model proved to be robust as multiple lease transactions occurred in
each trading period with arbitrage leading to a narrowing of price differ-
entials and a uniform price observed where most participants effectively
took on the role of their assigned user group. This work suggests that
addressing property rights issues in a timely fashion could lead to a situ-
ation where voluntary exchange leaves both parties to the exchange bet-
ter off.
[APPENDIX FOLLOWS]
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TABLE 7:
Weighted Average Price Per Acre-Foot by Scenario 
Round |
Scenario Dec Dry Inc Base
1 6.33 6.21 5.74 5.40
(2.86)a (2.74) (2.11) (2.79)
2 8.5 9.13 8.32 7.29
(3.24) (2.80) (2.02) (3.70)
3 8.62 10.62* 12.75* 8.62
(3.48) (3.07) (3.67) (4.09)
4 10.05* 10.54* 12.05* 8.66
(3.35) (3.51) (3.97) (4.09)
5 8.15 11.91 12.26 7.40
(2.96) (4.14) (4.62) (2.90)
6 9.86 10.96 10.99* 7.61
(2.90) (3.62) (3.08) (2.50)
7 10.22* 10.70* 9.11 6.24
(2.71) (3.33) (3.16) (2.61)
8 9.14* 10.00 6.68 7.12
(2.49) (3.75) (2.67) (2.61)
9 9.36 8.77 6.02 8.17
(2.60) (2.59) (2.37) (2.78)
10 9.28 8.26 4.45 5.09
(2.46) (3.25) (1.93) (2.35)
a values in parentheses are standard errors 
* denotes value is significantly different from expectations at the 5% level 
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